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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE TARIFF PERMITTED 
ANY CHARGES ABOVE THE CONNECTION FEE 
In their responsive briefs, Wilkinson Water Company (Wilkinson Water) and the 
Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as Commission or PSC) spend the 
majority of their argument discussing the application of "a decades old policy of looking to 
the real estate developer to pay costs for the installation of water plant facilities needed to 
serve his subdivision." (Brief of Respondent Public Service Commisson (PSC Brief) 11; 
Brief of Respondent Wilkinson Water Company (Wilkinson Water Brief) 9 (characterizing 
the application of the rule as application of "an interpretive guideline").) However, no such 
policy exists, and, even if it did, it would not be applicable to Mr. Bradshaw's circumstances. 
A. The Tariff Language Is Plain. Before the PSC could even consider the 
application of this purported policy, it was required to conclude that the tariff did not address 
the question brought before it by Mr. Bradshaw. However, the tariff addresses the precise 
question at issue. 
The proceedings before the Commission began when Mr. Bradshaw asserted that 
Wilkinson Water was unjustifiably refusing to provide service to Mr. Bradshaw's proposed 
subdivision. (R. at 2.) During the course of the proceedings Mr. Bradshaw contended that 
Wilkinson Water was violating the terms of its own tariff by requiring Mr. Bradshaw to pay 
more than the costs provided for in the tariff, a practice that is prohibited by Utah Code Ann. 
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§§ 54-3-2, -3, -7. (See R. at 37, 10-12; R. at 96, 3; R. at 97, 9-13; R. at 171, 5-9; R. at 227, 
6-8.) 
Thus, the threshold question before the Commission in Mr. Bradshaw's claim against 
Wilkinson Water was whether Wilkinson Water was violating the terms of its tariff. In its 
brief, Wilkinson Water concedes that "[tjariffs function much like statutes" and that they 
"constitute the 'rates, rules and regulations' by which a utility must operate." (Wilkinson 
Water Brief 19.) Additionally, neither the Commission nor Wilkinson Water dispute that in 
order to determine whether Wilkinson Water was violating its tariff the Commission was 
required to follow the well-settled rule in Utah public utility law that requires tariffs to be 
strictly construed against the utility: 
With respect to those tariffs, these observations are pertinent. They are filed 
by the utilities themselves and thus mainly serve their own interests. They 
should be construed strictly against the utility; and the utility should be 
required to strictly comply with them; and they must be fair, reasonable and 
lawful. 
Josephson v. Mountain Bell, 576 P.2d 850,852 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). Additionally, 
there is no question that the Commission is not entitled to deference on its interpretation of 
the tariff provisions at issue. "[T]he rule has traditionally been that an agency's 
interpretation of 'contracts and certificates' presents a question of law, reviewed 
nondeferentially for correctness, at least so long as ambiguous or technical terms are not 
involved [W]e are aware of no decision calling this familiar concept into question " 
Magnesium Corp. v. Air Quality Board, 941 P.2d 653, 657-58 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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In this case, the tariff requires a customer to pay a one-time connection charge of 
$1,500 for "3/4" service to property line, where service fronts property line, including meter 
and materials." (R. at 275. A copy of the Tariff is appended to this Reply Brief as Exhibit 
1. Hereinafter referred to as App. Ex. 1.) In addition, the Facility Extension Policy" in the 
tariff provides in full: 
1. Extensions. An extension is any continuation of, or branch from, the 
nearest available existing line of the Company, including any increase in 
capacity of an existing line to meet the customer's requirement. 
2. Costs. The total cost of extensions, including engineering, labor and 
material shall be paid by the applicants. Where more than one applicant is 
involved in an extension, the costs shall be prorated on the basis of the street 
frontage distances involved. Sufficient valves and fire hydrants shall be 
included with every installation. 
3. Construction Standards. Minimum standards of the Company shall be 
met, which standards shall also comply with the standards of the Utah State 
Bureau of the Environmental Health. Pipe sizes shall be designed by the 
Company, but the size shall never be smaller than 4". 
4. Ownership. Completed facilities shall be owned, operated, and 
maintained by the Company including and through the meters, as detailed in 
the Tariff Rules and Regulations. 
5. Water Storage and Supply. All costs for providing needed water supply 
and storage shall be paid by the Company. This cost shall include the 
installation and operation of pumps as required for proper pressure regulation 
of the system. 
6. Temporary Service. The customer will pay the total cost for the 
installation and removal of any extensions for service to a venture of a 
temporary or speculative permanency. The Company will receive the 
estimated cost from the customer before beginning work on the extension. 
(See App. Ex. l;R.at280.) 
The facility extension policy defines extension to include "any continuation of, or 
branch from, the nearest available existing line of the Company." It then provides the 
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relative burdens of the applicant and the water company. The total cost of the extensions is 
to be paid by the applicant. However, the costs for providing the water supply and storage 
is to be paid by Wilkinson Water, including the installation and operation of pumps as 
required for proper pressure regulation of the system. x There is no ambiguity in the language. 
In this instance, Mr. Bradshaw requested connection for his 21-lot subdivision. Mr. 
Bradshaw was ready, willing, and able to pay for the internal infrastructure of the 
subdivision,2 the connection fees, and the tariffed charges, as required by the tariff. 
However, rather than apply the tariff provisions as written, Wilkinson Water demanded that 
he pay the connection fee, the internal infrastructure, the other tariffed charges, plus 
untariffed amounts for additional water storage and water supply. This was a clear violation 
of the tariff. Wayne Wilkinson, the manager of Wilkinson Water, specifically testified that 
he understood that Wilkinson Water was violating the tariff when it asked for payment for 
water storage and supply. 
Q Okay, let's go down to paragraph five, water storage and supply, says: 
"All costs for providing needed water supply and storage shall be paid by the 
company." Do you abide by that part of your tariff? 
1
 Wilkinson Water collects a $ 1,500 connection fee under the tariff. Presumably, this 
fee is used for source and storage capacity. 
2
 Strangely, Wilkinson Water seems to contend that Mr. Bradshaw disputed his duty 
to pay for the infrastructure internal to the subdivision. (See Wilkinson Water Brief 11.) 
However, Wilkinson Water well knows that there has never been any doubt in Mr. 
Bradshaw's mind that he would be required to pay for that infrastructure. The only issues 
before the Commission were the issues identified in the hearing, i.e., whether the costs for 
storage and supply of water were justifiably charged to Mr. Bradshaw as part of the 
infrastructure costs. 
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A Used to. 
Q Read paragraph five again. Can you read paragraph five, tell me where 
that gives you the right to charge storage and source to Mr. Bradshaw? It 
prohibits that, doesn't it? 
A Yes. 
(R. at 227, 163-164.) 
Both the Commission and Wilkinson Water accuse Mr. Bradshaw of asking this Court 
to read paragraph 5 in isolation. Wilkinson Water argues that "the extension policy refers 
expressly to a 'customer,'" and that "Bradshaw (the developer, as opposed to a homeowner) 
is not a customer."3 (Wilkinson Water Brief at 20.) Further, it argues that Mr. Bradshaw is 
required to pay for the "'total costs of extension, including engineering, labor and material."' 
{Id.) 
As is obvious from this argument, Wilkinson Water is actually the one asking this 
Court to read the language of paragraph five of the tariff in isolation. First, it points to the 
use of the term "customer" in the tariff language to bolster its contention that the extension 
policy was not meant to apply to "developers," such as Mr. Bradshaw. However, Wilkinson 
Water never explains how using the word customer excludes a developer from being a 
customer. In fact, the term "customer" is quite clearly being used to describe any person who 
3
 As discussed in Mr. Bradshaw's opening brief, this attempt to distinguish a 
homeowner from a developer, who would sell lots to homeowners, is discriminatory. 
Whether one developer or 21 homeowners seek connection is immaterial. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-3-8 demands that they be treated the same. 
4817-8934-8352 BR0341 001 5 
applies for an extension of an existing line of the Company.4 Moreover, when explaining 
what costs are to be borne by the respective parties, the tariff refers to the person seeking the 
extension as an "applicant." {See id., f 2.) Of course, an applicant is a person who applies 
for a "service connection . . . to any part of the waterworks system." {See Ex. 1, R. at 276, 
12.) 
Additionally, the argument that paragraph two of the Facility Extension Policy 
requires Mr. Bradshaw to pay for the water and storage supply beyond the $ 1,500 connection 
fee also clearly violates basic rules of contract and statutory interpretation. Utah courts 
adhere to the rule that they will "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute 
superfluous or inoperative. Consequently, when two statutory provisions conflict in their 
operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the more general 
provision." Hall v. Utah State Dep 't Corrections, 2001 UT 34, | 15, 24 P.2d 958; see also 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357,1360 n.2,1361 n.5 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) (citing the maxims "a contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all 
of its provisions" and the secondary rule of contract interpretation of "favoring specific 
provisions over general"); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) ("Specific terms and 
exact terms are given greater weight than general language."). In this case, although the 
tariff does require Mr. Bradshaw to pay for the costs of extension, it specifically states that 
4
 The term "customer" is not defined in the tariff. Presumably, if Wilkinson Water 
desired to define "customer" to exclude a developer it could and should have done so. 
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Wilkinson Water is responsible for "[a]ll costs for providing needed water supply and storage 
. . ., including] the installation and operation of pumps as required for proper pressure 
regulation of the system." Given that the specific language of the facility extension policy 
requires Wilkinson Water to bear the total costs for providing the needed water supply and 
storage, it is, at best, disingenuous for Wilkinson Water to argue that the tariff, contrary to 
its plain language, provides for Mr. Bradshaw to pay all of the water storage and supply 
costs. Additionally, such a construction would render paragraph 5 superfluous. 
In its brief, the Commission addresses the tariff provisions in a cursory fashion, never 
acknowledging that it was required to interpret the tariffs provisions strictly against the 
utility. Rather, it argues that Mr. Bradshaw has failed to consider "whether his interpretation 
makes overall sense with the rest of the tariffs provisions." (See PSC Brief 21).5 It further 
explains in a footnote that Mr. Bradshaw's interpretation would require the Commission "to 
treat him as 21 individual customers, requesting 21 individual service extensions, paying 
$ 1,500 per connection." (See id. 21 n.4.) It then states that this would require Mr. Bradshaw 
to "be treated as 21 individual customers for other tariff provisions," arguing as if Mr. 
Bradshaw had not taken that position before. (See id.) However, that is exactly what Mr. 
Bradshaw has always proposed and has always stated he was willing to do. 
5
 The Commission also argues that Mr. Bradshaw failed to consider the potential 
impact of "his interpretation" on other customers and the Commission's purported policy 
regarding real estate developers. Each of these points will be treated separately below. 
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This argument again points out the irrationality of the Commission's position. The 
footnote claims that treating Mr. Bradshaw as 21 different customers somehow makes his 
request unmanageable. However, under the tariffs provisions, Mr. Bradshaw is required to 
design, engineer, and place the infrastructure for all 21 lots. Mr. Bradshaw has always been 
ready, willing, and able to do so. Considering that the 21 lots would be serving 21 different 
customers, Mr. Bradshaw has always recognized that 21 separate shut-off valves, meters, and 
meter boxes would be required and 21 separate accounts would be maintained upon 
connection. Apparently, the Commission is claiming that Mr. Bradshaw would be required 
to place the meter, meter boxes, shut-off valves, etc., at the time of application. However, 
no one, including new applicants, would be required to do so. The only thing new applicants 
are required to do is apply, pay the connection fee, and understand that they must provide the 
infrastructure required by the tariff. New non-developer applicants requesting connection 
to the system are in exactly the same position as Mr. Bradshaw. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission incorrectly concluded that the tariff 
provisions did not apply to Mr. Bradshaw. Given that the tariff language unambiguously 
provides that Mr. Bradshaw is required to pay for the internal infrastructure for connection 
of his subdivision, the Commission erred when it required that Mr. Bradshaw "participate 
in bearing the risks and costs of expanding a utility system to meet his project's needs." 
(Order on Reconsideration, R. at 216, 8. A copy of the Order on Reconsideration is 
appended to this brief as Exhibit 2. Hereinafter referred to as App. Ex. 2.) 
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B. No Decades-Old Policy Exists . Not only have Wilkinson Water and the 
Commission ignored the plain language of the tariff in their briefs to this Court, but they have 
improperly relied on what the Commission terms "a decades old policy of looking to the real 
estate developer to pay costs for the installation of water plant facilities needed to serve his 
subdivision." (PSC Brief \\\see also Wilkinson Water Brief 9.) 
First, there is no such policy that the Commission can identify. In both the January 
4, 2001, Report and Order and the February 26, 2002, Order on Reconsideration, although 
the Commission referenced such a "policy" it cited no statute, rule, regulation, internal 
departmental manual, or previous Commission Ruling or Order from which this policy 
derived. (See Report and Order 3-4; R. at 29, 3-4. A copy of the Report and Order is 
appended to this brief as Exhibit 3. Hereinafter referred to as App. Ex. 3.See also App. Ex. 
2, R. at 216, 5-6.) For the first time in its brief, however, the Commission identified the sole 
written source of what it contends established this policy—Utah Admin. Code R746-330-6. 
Rule R746-330-6 provides in its entirety the following: "There is a rebuttable presumption 
that the value of original utility plant and assets has been recovered in the sale of lots in a 
development to be served by a developer-owned water or utility system"' 
What is most obviously problematic about this claim is that this administrative rule 
does not provide any basis for the so-called "decades old policy." It says simply that the 
Commission is to presume that the cost of the original utility plant and assets have been 
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entirely recovered if (1) a developer owns the water system serving the lots and (2) the lots 
have been sold. 
The rule obviously does not apply here. First, the Wilkinson Water Company is not 
a developer-owned water system. Second, even if Wilkinson Water were a developer-owned 
water system, the Wilkinson Water Company has not sold any lots in Mr. Bradshaw's 
subdivision. Obviously, this rule was meant to apply against a water utility owned by the 
developer of the lots served by the utility to prevent the developer-owned utility from 
recovering the costs of its utility plant and assets both from the sale of lots and from its 
ratebase. One need look only at the caption of the rule—"Ratebase Treatment of 
Developer-owned Water or Sewer Company Assets - Presumption of Recovery"—to 
discover this as the intent of the regulation. See Utah Admin. Code RR746-330-6. 
If anything, this rule supports Mr. Bradshaw's position. The rule states that a 
developer-owned utility is presumed to have recovered the costs of its plant and assets from 
the sale of lots. In this case, Mr. Bradshaw has had no opportunity to recover for utility plant 
and assets twice—he does not own the utility. Thus, the rule must apply to the only entity 
that would be in a position to recover those costs twice—Wilkinson Water. 
Applying the rule to Wilkinson Water shows that when the presumption is properly 
applied it helps, not hurts, David Bradshaw. Either Wilkinson Water is presumed to have (1) 
recovered the costs of its original plant and assets when it sold any lots it may have originally 
owned that it intended the Water Company to exclusively serve or (2) it planned the water 
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company facilities to be large enough to cover other developments in its service area. In the 
former instance, since the sale of the lots presumably paid for the original plant and assets, 
the additional tariffed charges must presumably have been for the impact any future 
connection would place on the original water system so as to fairly assess the portion of 
expansion that would be attributable to expansion caused by future connections. Thus, in this 
instance, the tariffed facility extension policy treats the connection fees and tariffed charges 
as sufficient to allow for expansion of the system—explicitly identifying the costs to be borne 
by each party. In the latter instance, the tariffed fees and charges must have been set so as 
to allow the recovery of the original costs. In either event, the presumption is against 
Wilkinson Water' s position: either (1) Wilkinson Water must overcome the presumption that 
the tariffed charges were sufficient to cover anticipated growth, or (2) it must overcome the 
presumption that the tariffed charges were intended to recover the costs of the original plant 
and assets and, thus, included an implicit assumption that the tariffed charges were sufficient 
to allow for expansion. 
This Court has often held that it will only "uphold an agency's interpretation of its 
own rules'' if "that interpretation is 'reasonable and rational.'" R.O.A. General, Inc. v. Utah 
Dep 't of Transportation, 966 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1997). Further, this Court has stated that 
an interpretation which "ignores specific language" is "unreasonable." Id. The above 
discussion highlights the irrationality of the Commission's position regarding this purported 
policy. First, the Commission never explicitly identified the "policy" upon which it was 
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relying in either of its orders. Second, the Commission ignored the specific language of the 
rule it finally identified as the "decades old policy" upon which it was relying. Third, the 
rule cited actually supports Mr. Bradshaw's position. Accordingly, this Court should reject 
the Commission's interpretation of the only rule that it contends supports its decision. 
C. Conclusion to Point I. As discussed above, Wilkinson Water and the 
Commission contend that the application of "a decades old policy of looking to the real estate 
developer to pay costs for the installation of water plant facilities needed to serve his 
subdivision" supports the Commission decision in this case. (PSC Brief 11; see also 
Wilkinson Water Brief 9 (characterizing the application of the rule as application of "an 
interpretive guideline").) No such policy exists. The single rule cited and relied upon by 
the Commission does not even apply to Mr. Bradshaw's situation. 
Moreover, before the Commission could ever consider the application of this policy, 
it was first required to conclude that the tariff did not apply to this situation. The 
Commission erred when it failed to strictly construe the tariff language and concluded that 
it did not apply in this case. Additionally, the Commission erred when it irrationally 
interpreted R746-330-6 as requiring a real estate developer to pay costs for the installation 
of water plant facilities need to serve his subdivision despite the tariff language. 
II. PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COMMISSION DECISION 
Finally, even if this Court were to conclude that the tariff language was not clear and 
that the public policy could be inferred from the rule cited by the Commission, the 
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Commission's assertion of the public policy in this case is irrational. Although the 
Commission continues to contend that the risk to a utility from a will-serve letter given to a 
developer owner is greater than from a will-serve letter to a non-developer owner, neither the 
logic, as discussed in the Petitioner's Brief, nor the facts of this case supports that contention. 
First, the fact that Mr. Bradshaw, after connecting and dedicating the water delivery 
system for his developed subdivision, would sell to a third-party should make no difference 
at all to the water company. When Mr. Bradshaw connects his development to the system 
he will be required to pay the connection fee. If he then later sells any lot, there is no 
increased burden because the connection fee has already been paid. This situation is no 
different from a prospective non-developer customer paying a connection fee and then selling 
his or her property after he has lived in it. 
Second, that Mr. Bradshaw would make no additional contribution to the Company's 
cost beyond dedicating the infrastructure is simply wrong. Any person who connects to the 
system is required to pay the connection fee and the other tariffed charges.6 Thus, the 
Commission's statement that Mr. Bradshaw would not be making any additional contribution 
to the Company's cost is impossible—if a lot owner wants to connect to the Wilkinson Water 
system, somebody has to pay the connection fee and the other tariffed costs. Further, 
whether Mr. Bradshaw or a third-party pays the connection fee is irrelevant—the connection 
6
 The purposes and use of the $1,500 connection fee in the tariff have never been 
disclosed by Wilkinson Water. Accordingly, it must be assumed that source and storage 
requirements are addressed in that fee. 
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fee will have been paid, and, under the Commission's interpretation of the tariff, that 
connection fee and the other tariffed charges will offset the costs of providing water storage 
and supply. 
The underlying premise of the argument really seems to be that, because the developer 
may or may not sell lots in his or her subdivision, somehow the developer's risk of selling lots 
increases the cost to the water company. This simply does not follow. If the connection fee 
and the other tariffed costs are sufficient to cover the increased costs of providing water 
storage and supply in the non-developer situation, it should be sufficient to cover the 
increased costs of providing water storage and supply in the developer situation. The only 
difference in the two situations is the status of the original owner; the economics simply do 
not change. Moreover, if it is fair to impose the risk on the water company in the non-
developer owner situation, which the Commission explicitly concluded, it is fair to impose 
the risk on the water company in the developer owner situation. There is no more "vagary" 
in the approval process for a subdivision than in the approval process for individual lots. 
In fact, the evidence in the hearing undermines the Commission's position and support 
Mr. Bradshaw's. In the hearing, Wayne Wilkinson testified that Wilkinson Water has given 
will-serve commitments of up to eight non-developer owners who have not developed their 
properties after several years—some more than ten years. (See R. at 227,176-177,178,180, 
190-91). Further, there is evidence that Wilkinson Water has committed to subdivisions in 
the past for the supply of water. In all but two instances, Wilkinson Water required no more 
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than the connection fee. (See R. at 227, 171, 174-80, 190-91.) If the addition of developer 
owners was truly a great economic drain on the water company it would seem that Wilkinson 
Water would have been treating the developer owners differently through its entire history. 
Additionally, Wilkinson Water would have provided evidence to show that the developers 
caused a greater drain on the company. The fact is that Wilkinson Water never has claimed 
that developer owners should be treated differently than regular owners. Even in the hearing, 
Wayne Wilkinson testified that the only reason for Mr. Bradshaw's different treatment was 
that he believed that serving Mr. Bradshaw would cause Wilkinson Water to exceed its 
supply and storage capacity. (R. at 227, 180; see also id. at 171, 174-80, 190-91.) 
Moreover, Wilkinson Water did not demand that Mr. Bradshaw merely pay his "fair 
share" of the purportedly increased demand that his development placed on the system as 
seemingly argued by the Respondents. The evidence at the hearing demonstrated that 
Wilkinson Water demanded that Mr. Bradshaw provide a 100,000 gallon water storage tank, 
a 200 gallon per minute well, and other infrastructure. (See R. at 227, 14; Hearing Ex. 2.) 
The demand for the storage tank required Mr. Bradshaw to provide approximately 700% 
more storage than the demand placed on the system. The demand for the well required Mr. 
Bradshaw to provide approximately 1100% of the demand his subdivision would place on 
the system.7 Given the clearly excessive demand placed on Mr. Bradshaw, it would seem 
7
 Given the unreasonable demands that Wilkinson Water has continually made to Mr. 
Bradshaw throughout the history of this case, it seems most strange that the Respondents 
would complain that Mr. Bradshaw is not requesting that this Court determine what "his fair 
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that public policy would support the position that a public utility be required to assess only 
what it has been permitted to charge in its tariffs, even if the person seeking services is a 
developer. Otherwise, those seeking services from a utility are subject to the extortionate 
power of the utility to demand costs without justification or leaving the person requesting 
service without recourse. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission's enunciation of a policy is unreasonable 
and irrational. Further, the policy unfairly and unreasonably discriminates against Mr. 
Bradshaw in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8, which expressly prohibits such 
discrimination. 
III. THE COMMISSION CLEARLY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT WILKINSON WATER'S 
SOURCE AND STORAGE CAPACITY MIGHT BE EXCEEDED IF M R . BRADSHAW'S 
DEVELOPMENT WAS SERVED 
In an attempt to respond to the arguments raised by Mr. Bradshaw regarding the 
share" is. {See Wilkinson Water Brief 11.) It is not true that Mr. Bradshaw is not interested 
in fairness as seemingly suggested. Further, it is not true that Mr. Bradshaw presented only 
"vague evidence as to what that 'fair share' should be." There was substantial evidence that 
Wilkinson Water had already placed a value on its illegal exactions: $100 per lot for source 
and $400 per lot for storage. {See R. at 227, 106). 
More importantly, however, Wilkinson Water failed to produce any evidence in the 
hearing that justified its departure from its historic practice of (1) assessing only tariffed 
charges and/or (2) requiring that developers pay only connection fees. Further, it provided 
no evidence that supported its only claimed basis for making its illegal demands—that 
Wilkinson Water did not have sufficient water storage or supply to service Mr. Bradshaw's 
development. Given Wilkinson Water's failure to show even one piece of evidence 
supporting its demand for payment of charges outside of the tariff, it should come as no 
surprise that Mr. Bradshaw has not presented the issue of the Commission's failure to 
properly assess Mr. Bradshaw's proportionate share to this Court. 
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Commission's clearly erroneous factual findings, Wilkinson Water and the Commission 
make several arguments. First, both the Commission and Wilkinson Water contend that, 
because the Commission has independent authority under Title 54 of the Utah Code to 
establish each utility's compliance with their duty to provide adequate, efficient, just, and 
reasonable services, the evidence regarding sufficient source and storage capacity was largely 
irrelevant and could be ignored. (See PSC Brief 7-8; Wilkinson Water Brief 5-6). Second, 
they argue that substantial evidence did support the Commission's findings that Mr. 
Bradshaw's development would overtax Wilkinson Water's system. (PSC Brief 22-28; 
Wilkinson Water 16-19.) Each of these arguments is fatally flawed. 
A. The Evidence Regarding Source and Storage Was Not Irrelevant. As stated 
above, the Commission and Wilkinson Water assert that given the Commission's duty to 
assess the reasonableness of Wilkinson Water's conduct, evidence regarding Wilkinson 
Water's source and storage capacity was largely irrelevant. This argument, however, belies 
the Commission's order and the parties' arguments in this case. 
The Commission's brief begins with the statement that, because "Mr. Bradshaw 
desire[d] to develop part of his property" and asked "Wilkinson Water... to be prepared to 
provide . . . service," the request would "require the construction of additional utility plant." 
(PSC Brief 5.) Additionally, Wilkinson Water contends in its brief that its system "'is at or 
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near capacity for both source and storage resources.[ ] ' " (Wilkinson Water Brief 2.) They, 
therefore, have contended that Bradshaw's development was required to provide a "tank, a 
well, and other infrastructure to serve his project." (Wilkinson Water Brief 4.)9 In fact, 
Wayne Wilkinson, President of Wilkinson Water, testified that the only reason he was 
demanding that Mr. Bradshaw pay for source and storage above the tariffed charges was 
because they no longer had source and storage capacity.10 
In coming to its decision, the Commission found that "future demand from individuals 
8
 It bears noting that, although Wilkinson Water and the Commission point to the fact 
that storage capacity has been exceeded in their briefs, they ignore the testimony of Wayne 
Wilkinson. He stated: "Well, the storage is not really out technically, because we have got 
it there if we need to have it, but it belongs to a private individual [Wilkinson family 
members], and we don't have any objection to using it. It has been used in the past. We 
have not purchased it back from the water company, but when it's been necessary to use in 
these high times, we just let it go." (R. at 227, 173-74.) 
9
 This description of the demand largely understates the enormity of the conditions 
originally placed on Mr. Bradshaw. The evidence at the hearing demonstrated that 
Wilkinson Water demanded that Mr. Bradshaw provide a 100,000 gallon water storage tank, 
a 200 gallon per minute well, and other infrastructure. (See R. at 227, 14.) The demand for 
the storage tank required Mr. Bradshaw to provide approximately 700% more storage than 
the demand placed on the system. The demand for the well required Mr. Bradshaw to 
provide approximately 1100% of the demand his subdivision would place on the system. 
10
 Wayne Wilkinson testified: 
Q. How about providing any source or storage? 
A. None of those people in the first couple of subdivisions did that. 
The water company built and designed the first one in part because some of the 
subdivisions was going on, we designed the building. So we didn't require at 
that time that they provide the source or storage because we already had it 
available. Just like the same thing with Silver Stone, when Mike come in there 
we had source and had storage, didn't require him to buy source and storage 
because we had it available but we don't anymore. 
(R. at 227, 180; see also id. at 171, 174-80, 190-91.) 
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who may locate in Mr. Bradshaw's proposed subdivision make the Company's existing 
capacities appear to be inadequate." (App. Ex. 2; R. at 216, 8.) Accordingly, the 
Commission concluded that Mr. Bradshaw would be required to 
pay for the proportionate share of water plant costs that are reasonably 
attributable to provide water service to his proposed subdivision. These costs 
include the physical water plant, which include water source (new wells or 
upgrades for increased water production from existing wells), water storage 
tanks, water distribution facilities and equipment, and the costs incurred in 
planning for such plant and its construction and installation. . . . The 
proportion should be based upon the capability or capacity of the plan installed 
and the capability or capacity reasonably needed to provide service to Mr. 
Bradshaw's proposed development. Wilkinson Water will bear the costs 
associated with water plant [sic] that is planned or put in place that exceeds the 
needs of Mr. Bradshaw's proposed development. 
(/</.; R. at 216, 10.) 
Given this evidence and the explicit findings and conclusions of the Commission, it 
is disingenuous for the Commission to claim that capacity of Wilkinson Water's system was 
not significant to the Commission's decision. It was the most important factual issue at the 
hearing. If Wilkinson Water had sufficient source and storage capacity, then its claimed 
basis for assessing the costs on Mr. Bradshaw disappear. 
B. No Evidence Supported the Commission's Findings 
L Stipulated Facts. Given that the evidence regarding source and storage 
capacity was relevant, the next issue raised is whether the evidence presented supported the 
Commission's findings that Wilkinson Water was required to fund additional plant and asset 
development because of Mr. Bradshaw's development. The Commission and Wilkinson 
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Water argue that sufficient evidence existed to support the Commission's findings. In doing 
so, they claim that permitting evidence of source and storage capacity offered outside of the 
parties' stipulations was permissible. 
As discussed in Mr. Bradshaw's first brief, on July 20,2001, pursuant to a Scheduling 
Notice entered by the Commission, the parties filed with the Commission stipulated facts and 
issues for rehearing. (See Issue and Fact List for Rehearing; R. at 96. A copy of the Issue 
and Fact List for Rehearing is appended as Exhibit 4. Hereinafter referred to as App. Ex. 4.) 
In the section entitled "Stipulated Facts", the parties stipulated as follows: 
Petitioner and Respondent hereby stipulate to the following facts: 
5. The Utah Administrative Code, R309-203, Table 203-1 titled "Source 
Demand for Community Water Systems (Indoor Use)," provide that peak day 
demand for residential connections is 800 gpd or .56 gpm per lot. 
Accordingly, the amount of source capacity for indoor use for Petitioner's 
subdivision is 11.76 gpm [gallons per minute] (.56 x 21 lots). 
6. The Utah Administrative Code, R309-[203-7(3)], titled "Estimated 
Outdoor Use," provides the appropriate calculation necessary for outdoor 
water use for residential property. The section provides that to determine 
irrigable acreage, start with "gross acreage, then subtract out any area of 
roadway, driveway, sidewalk or patio pavement along with housing foundation 
footprints that can be reasonably expected for lots within a new subdivision." 
7. The Utah Administrative Code, Table 203-4 requires 400 gallons 
storage for indoor use for each lot. Hence, Petitioner's proposed development 
would require a storage capacity of 8,400 gallons for indoor use (21 lots x 400 
gallons). 
8. Utah Admin. Code R309-203(8)(2)(c)) requires 1,873 gallons per 
irrigable acre of storage capacity. 
(Id.; R. at 96, 2-3.) Additionally, the parties identified in the disputed fact section the 
following: 
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Petitioner and Respondent state that the following facts are disputed and must 
be resolved: 
1. The amount of infrastructure cost within the subdivision that David L. 
Bradshaw will be required to pay to connect residences to the existing water 
system. 
2. The total amount of source capacity that Wilkinson Water Company 
has. 
3. The total amount of storage capacity that Wilkinson Water Company 
has. 
4. What the average irrigable acreage of each .46 acre lot in the 
Petitioner's proposed subdivision is. 
5. The amount of residential connections that Wilkinson Water Company 
currently has and the number of committed connections. 
(A/.; R. at 96, 3.) 
As is evident from these stipulations, the parties stipulated as to the figures the 
Commission should use to determine the amount of demand that each connection placed on 
the system. In other words, the parties stipulated that no other water data would be presented 
to vary from the assumptions and that the figures used in the regulations would be stipulated 
to as accurate.[ { For example, for each residential connection, the parties stipulated that the 
11
 This argument points out the problem with the Wilkinson Water and Commission 
arguments that Mr. Bradshaw is contending that the Commission is bound to follow the 
regulations of another agency. Nothing is further from the truth. 
The stipulations merely referenced the regulations to demonstrate the basis for the 
parties stipulations. In other words, the parties agreed that the source and storage capacity 
requirements were properly set forth in the regulation and firm data did not exist to contradict 
those numbers. The parties were not stipulating that the Commission was bound to follow 
the regulations but were stipulating that the standards set forth in the regulations would be 
relied upon by the parties and the Commission. 
There are additional problems with the Commission's arguments. The Commission 
seems to be contending that it knows better how to determine source and storage capacity 
requirements of a water system than the regulatory agency explicitly granted discretion to 
regulate that issue. It seems to say that despite the fact that the Drinking Water Board has 
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demand for indoor use placed on the system for source capacity was 11.76 gpm and for 
storage capacity was 8,400 gallons. Additionally, the demand for outdoor use placed on the 
system for storage capacity was 1,873 gallons for each irrigable acre served per connection. 
Finally, the demand for outdoor use placed on the system for source capacity was to be 
calculated using Table 203-3 found in Utah Admin. Code R309-203-7(3). Additionally, the 
parties stipulated that the only disputed facts were the average irrigable acreage of each lot, 
the amount of residential connections, and the source and storage capacity for each lot. 
Despite these stipulations, Wilkinson Water presented evidence that the source and 
storage capacities may differ from the numbers stipulated to by the parties. (See R. at 227, 
56-59, 60-62, 89-92, 205-209, 246-250.) When Mr. Bradshaw objected to the presentation 
of evidence outside of the stipulated issues and facts, the Commission overruled the 
objection. (R. at 227, 62.) Neither the Commission or Wilkinson Water deny that this is so 
nor do they deny that the Commission considered this objected-to evidence in making its 
determination. 
Instead, they respond by creating and responding to an argument never advanced by 
Mr. Bradshaw. They contend that by requiring the parties to abide by their stipulations, Mr. 
fixed presumptive standards that can be varied only by "firm water use data," see Utah 
Admin. Code R309-203-7(2); R309-203-7(3), the Commission can ignore those standards 
on the basis of the vaguest of water use data simply because the Commission has some 
general regulatory mandate to govern utilities. One would think the Commission would give 
the regulations of the agency regulating all drinking water in the state of Utah more than a 
passing notice. 
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Bradshaw has attempted to restrain the Commission's authority and discretion. (See 
Wilkinson Water Brief 14; PSC Brief 8.) Further, they contend that Mr. Bradshaw is 
requiring the Commission to be bound by the parties stipulations as to "points of law." 
(Wilkinson Water Brief 15; PSC Brief 8.) Apparently, this argument is based upon the fact 
that Wilkinson Water and Mr. Bradshaw referenced the Division of Drinking Water 
regulations when asserting the stipulations. 
Nothing can be further from Mr. Bradshaw's argument. Mr. Bradshaw has contended 
only that the parties stipulated to the use of the presumptive water consumption figures found 
in the regulations—which, as described above, is exactly what they did. Accordingly, 
Wilkinson Water is bound by the rules regarding stipulations, which have been adopted 
explicitly by the Commission. See Utah Admin. Code R746-100-10(F)(4). "Parties are 
bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the court, which has the power to set 
aside a stipulation entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause." First of Denver 
Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979). 
The reason for this rule is obvious. Parties who have stipulated to facts should be 
bound by them. Otherwise, one party relying on the stipulation will be disadvantaged at the 
time of trial or hearing. In this case, Mr. Bradshaw went to the Commission prepared to 
present evidence relative to the disputed facts and issues stipulated to by the parties. He was 
not prepared to present any water use data as to consumption because the parties had 
stipulated that the administrative regulations' presumptions would control and that the only 
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issues in dispute were those identified in the Issue and Fact List for Rehearing. To allow the 
Commission's behavior in this case would seriously prejudice Mr. Bradshaw. 
2. The Commission's Finding Is Not Supported by Substantial Facts. 
Although Wilkinson Water and the Commission attempt to support the findings of the 
Commission, it is clear that there was not sufficient evidence presented to support the 
Commission's findings. The only competent and relevant evidence, as extensively detailed 
in pages 24 to 38 of the Petitioner's Brief, shows that even under the worst case scenarios 
there is sufficient source and storage capacity for Wilkinson Water to serve Mr. Bradshaw's 
development. Given that Wilkinson Water's only claimed basis for charging Mr. Bradshaw 
rates higher than the tariffed rates was that Mr. Bradshaw would cause a demand on the 
system which would require Wilkinson Water to expand its source and storage facilities, it 
was clearly erroneous for the Commission to require Mr. Bradshaw to pay more than the 
tariffed rates. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission acted unreasonably when it failed to interpret the tariff strictly 
against Wilkinson Water and interpreted the tariff in a discriminatory manner. Because it 
gave the tariff a broad construction, it concluded that Wilkinson Water was permitted to 
charge fees contrary to the explicit terms of the tariff, which state that the utility is 
responsible for all water source and storage costs. Accordingly, Mr. Bradshaw requests that 
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this Court reverse the Commission's decision and hold that Wilkinson Water cannot charge 
more than the $1,500 connection fee provided for in the tariff. 
If the Court concludes, however, that the Commission acted reasonably in construing 
the Wilkinson Water tariff to permit charges for water source and storage, the Commission 
did not have substantial evidence to find that Wilkinson Water would exceed capacity in the 
event that Mr. Bradshaw's development were served by it. The evidence overwhelming 
shows that Wilkinson Water had sufficient capacity to serve Mr. Bradshaw's development. 
Accordingly, Mr. Bradshaw respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Commission 
finding regarding Wilkinson Water's capacity and hold that Mr. Bradshaw is not required to 
pay anything above the connection fee and other tariffed charges. 
DATED this \°\^ day of December, 2002. 
SMITOHARTVIGSEN, PLLC. 
J. Craig Smith 
D. Scott Crook 
Attorneys for Petitioner, David Bradshaw 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2°*day of December, 2002,1 did cause two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF to be mailed, United 
States mails, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
William N. White, Esq. 
WHITE & MABEY 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent Wilkinson Water Company 
Sander J. Mooy 
Public Service Commission 
160 East 300 South, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent Public Service Commission 
Kent L. Waigren 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Wilkinson Water Company 
Morgan, Utah 
Original Sheet No. 1 
P. S. C. Utah No. 1 
SCHEDULE OF RATES 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
TARIFF NO. 
Issued on not less than five days' notice to the Commission and 
the Public by authority of the Public Service Commission of Utah, 
Order in Case No. 95-019-01 dated December 22, 1995. 
Issued December 22, 1995 Effective December 22, 1995 
W I L K I N S O N W A T E R C O M P A N Y 
Notice to Water Users, 
On December 22, 1995, the Public Service of Utah 
approved the Company's application for a rate increase 
and a change in the rate structure. Effective 
January 1, 1996, the new rates applicable to all water 
users in the Company's service area are as follows: 
First 6,000 gallons at $15.00 minimum charge; 
Over 6,000 gallons at $1.15 per 1,000 gallons, 
or part thereof. 
The new rate structure is designed to provide ample water 
for your reasonable needs, but-also to encourage 
conservation 
by making water use which is well m excess of the State 
standards for household water consumption more expensive. 
The January 1, 1996 water bill for the month of Decemoer, 
1995, was figured on the old rates. 
Wilkinson Water Company 
Wilkinson Water Company Original Sheet No. 2 
Morgan, Utah P. s. C. Utah No. 1 
I N D E X 
Description Sheet No, 
Title and Authority 1 
Index 2 
Rate Schedule 3 
Rules and Regulations: 
1. Connections 4 
2. Application for Permit 4 
3. Metering of Service 4 
4. Meter Adjustments 4 
5. Service Connections 5 
6. Service Line 5 
7. Water Use Restrictions 5 
8. Service Turn-On and Turn-off 5 
9. Disruption Liability 5 
10. Damage to Facilities 6 
11. Reading of Meters o 
12. Billing and Payments 6 
13. Credit Deposit 6 
14. Regulated Usage 7 
15. Changes and Amendments 7 
F a c i l i t y E x t e n s i o n P o l i c y : 
1. Extensions 3 
2. Costs 3 
3. Construction Standards 8 
4. Ownership 8 
5. Water Storage and Supply a 
6. Temporary Service 8 
WiIkinson Water 
Morgan, Utah 
Company First Revised Sheet No. 3 
P. S . C. Utah No. 1 
WATER SERVICE RATE SCHEDULE 
App1icabi1i ty 
Applicable in entire service area to water service for 
culinary and domestic purposes at one point of delivery 
for use at a single dwelling unit, and for commercial 
purposes at a single business connection. 
Rate 
The- fo.l lowing rate is for the period of one month: 
Usage Charges 
First 5,000 gallons 3 20-00 Fixed Charge 
Over 6,000 gallons 1.65 per 1,000 gallons 
Service Connection Charges 
:.''4" service to property line, where 
s~r v ice fronts property iins, 
including me:sr arrd materials. 
One time charge for e^ icn service 
requiring new -eter installation. Si, 500.CO 
.
 ;
. i .'*. ~ •'.: !i :i < r r v i c e w n o r e •* e •. *3 r is 
: » •:«:- a d y in pi a c •:• S 5 0.00 
Issued: June 12, 1998 Effective: June 13, 1998 
Wilkinson Water Company 
Morgan, Utah 
Original Sheet No. 4 
P. S. C. Utah No. 1 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
1. Connect ions. No unauthorized person shall tap any 
water main or distribution pipe of the Company or insert 
fixture or appliance, or alter or disturb any service pipe, 
meter, or any other attachment, being part of the waterworks 
system and attached thereto. No person shall install any 
water service pipe or connect or disconnect any such service 
pipe with or from the mains or distribution pipes of said 
waterworks system, nor with or from any other service pipe 
now or hereafter connected with said system, nor make any 
repairs, additions to, or alternations of any such service 
pipe, tap, stop cock, or any other fixture or attachments 
connected with any such service pipe, without first 
procuring a permit from the Company. 
2. Application for Permit. Before any service connection 
shall be made to any part of the.waterworks system, or any 
work performed upon old or new connect ions, a permit shall 
be obtained from the Company. -Such permit shall be issued 
upon written application on forms obtainable from the 
Company. Applicants for water service shall furnish and lay 
and install all the portion of the service not provided by 
the Company, at their own expense, subject, however, to the 
supervision and inspection of the Company. 
3. Metering of Service. All water delivered by the 
Company to its customers shall be metered through water 
meters. Meters may be checked, inspected, or adjusted at 
the discretion of the Company and shall not be opened or 
adjusted except by authorized representatives of the 
Company. Meter boxes shall not be opened for the purpose of 
turning on or off water except by authorized representative 
of the Company, unless special permission is given, or 
except in case of emergency. Unauthorized entry into the 
water box may result in loss of service. 
4. Meter Adjustments. If the meter fails to register at 
any time, the water delivered during such a period shall be 
estimated on the basis of previous consumption. In the 
event a meter is found to be recording less than 97 percent 
or more than 103 percent of accuracy, the Company may make 
such adjustments in the customer's previous bill as are just 
and fair under the circumstances. 
Wilkinson Water Company 
Morgan, Utah 
Original Sheet No. 5 
P. S. C. Utah No. 1 
RULES AND REGULATIONS (Continued) 
5. Service Connections. Any party desiring to obtain a 
supply of water from the Company shall make application in 
writing. The service connection charges shown m this 
Tariff include a meter, meter box, a cover, and a valved 
service line to the property line. The meter and meter box 
will be located as directed by the Company. All materials 
furnished by the Company shall remain the property thereof. 
Excavation and installation shall be made by the Company 
from the main line connection in the road to three feet 
beyond the meter. 
6. Service Line. All service line materials and 
installation shall be provided by the applicant. 
Installation shall be inspected and approved by the Company 
before the service line trench is backfilled. A shutoff 
valve shall be provided by the applicant on each service 
line, in an accessible location, separate from the water 
meter box. 
7. Water Use Restrictions. The owner or occupant of any 
building or premises entitled to the use of water from the 
Company shall not supply water to any other building or 
premises, except upon written permission of the Company. 
8. Service Turn-on and Turn-off. No unauthorized person 
shall turn the water from any main or distribution pipe into 
any service pipe. Service may be turned off by the Company 
when so requested by the applicant or when the applicant 
fails to abide by these regulations. Whenever the water is 
turned off from any premise, it shall not be turned on again 
until the applicable charge shown in the rate scheduled has 
been paid. 
9. Disruption Liability. The Company shall use reasonable 
diligence to provide continuous water service to its 
customers, and shall make a reasonable effort to furnish 
them with a clean, pure supply of water, free from injurious 
substance. The Company shall not be held liable for damages 
to any water user by reason of any stoppage or interruption 
of his water supply caused by scarcity of water, accidents 
to works or water main alterations, additional repair, acts 
of God, or other unavoidable causes. 
Wilkinson Water Company 
Morgan, Utah 
Original Sheet No. 6 
P. S. C Utah No. 1 
RULES AND REGULATIONS (Continued) 
10. D_amage to Facilities. Water meter may be installed 
upon any premises supplied with water, and any damage to 
said meter, or other facilities of the Company, resulting 
from the failure of the owner, agent, or tenant to properly 
protect same shall be assessed against such owner, agent, or 
tenant. Water consumers shall not tamper with or remove the 
meter, or interfere with the reading thereof. 
11. Reading of Meters. All meters will be read by the 
Company each month, excepting November, December, January, 
February and March. The monthly charges for the months when 
meters are read shall be based upon the meter readings, 
except as provided for in Paragraph 4 herein above. The 
monthly charge for the months the meters are not read will 
be a rate of $15.00 per month. 
12. Billing and Payments. 3iHs covering the charges shall 
be rendered monthly and shall be due fifteen (15) days after 
being rendered. If any customer neglects, fails, or refuses 
to pay water service bill or any other obligation due to the 
Company within thirty (30) days from the date of said bill, 
the Company's employees shall have the right to go upon the 
premises and make such excavation or do such work as may be 
necessary to disconnect the water service. Before the 
service is renewed, the delinquent bill or bills shall be 
paid in full, or arrangements made for payment that are 
satisfactory to the Company, and the established Tariff 
charge for re-connect ion shall be paid by the delinquent 
customer. Late fee in the amount of 1-1/2% per month of the 
unpaid balance may be assessed against past due accounts. 
1
• Credit Deposit. The Company may, at its option and in 
"*u of established credit, require a deposit from the 
tomer to assure payment of bills as they mature; such 
sits shall be a minimum of 90 days estimated bill or 
*0. Deposits may be refunded when credit has been 
'ished. Deposits held over 12 months shall earn 
it from the Company at the rate of 12% per annum, 
t will be credited to the account of the consumer 
Wilkinson Water Company 
Morgan, Utah 
Original Sheet No. 7 
P. S. C. Utah No. 1 
RULES AND REGULATIONS (Continued) 
14. Regulated Usage. Whenever the Company shall determine 
that the amount of water available to its distribution 
system has reached such a volume that, unless restricted, 
the public health, safety, and general welfare is likely to 
be endangered, it may prescribe rules and regulations to 
conserve the water supply during such emergency. Likewise, 
the use of water for sprinkling lawns and gardens, and the 
hours for such use, may be prescribed by regulations adopted 
for the governing of said water system. 
15. Changes and Amendments. The right is reserved to amend 
or add to these Rules and Regulations as experience may show 
it to be necessary and as such changes are approved by the 
Utah Public Service Commission. 
Wilkinson Water Company 
Morgan, Utah 
Original Sheet No. 3 
P. S. C. Utah No. 1 
FACILITY EXTENSION POLICY 
1. Extensions. An extension is any continuation of, or 
branch from, the nearest available existing line of the 
Company, including any increase in capacity of an existing 
line to meet the customer's requirement. 
2* Costs. The total cost of extensions, including 
engineering, labor and material shall be paid by the 
applicants. Where more than one applicant is involved in an 
extension, the costs shall be prorated on the basis of the 
street frontage distances involved. Sufficient valves and 
fire hydrants shall be included with every installation. 
3. Construct ion Standards. Minimum standards of the 
Company shall be met, which standards shall also comply with 
the standards of the Utah State Bureau of the Environmental 
Health. Pipe sizes shall be designed by the Company, but. 
the size shall never be smaller than 4". 
4. Ownership. Completed facilities shall be owned, 
operated, and maintained by the Company including and 
through the meters, as detailed in the Tariff Rules and 
Regulations. 
5. Water Storage and Supply. All costs for providing 
needed water supply and storage shall be paid by the 
Company. This cost shall include the installation and 
operation of pumps as required for proper pressure 
regulation of the system. 
6. Temporary Service. The customer will pay the total 
cost for the installation and removal of any extensions for 
service to a venture of a temporary or speculative 
permanency. The Company will receive the estimated cost 
from the customer before beginning work on the extension. 
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OOC'utTED 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In the Matter of David L. Bradshaw 
vs. 
Wilkinson Water Developer's Request for 
Commission Intervention 
DOCKET NO. 00-019-01 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION 
ISSUED: February 26, 2002 
By the Commission: 
The Commission originally adopted an Administrative Law Judge 
Recommended Order in this Docket on January 4, 2001. The Order dismissed Mr. David 
Bradshaw's complaint, determining that he had "failed to prove violations of [Wilkinson 
Water Company's] tariffs, or of Commission rules, or other applicable law." January 4, 
2001, Order, page 4. Thereafter, Mr. Bradshaw petitioned for reconsideration. The 
Commission granted reconsideration on March 14, 2001. After numerous, unsuccessful 
efforts by the parties to mutually resolve their dispute after the grant of reconsideration, 
the parties informed the Commission that they were unable to resolve the matter through 
mutual agreement and that the Commission should proceed with reconsideration. 
Discussion with counsel for the parties indicated that the parties had factual disputes on 
matters which they claimed were relevant to resolution of the dispute and continued to 
have disputes concerning the application of the factual record previously developed in 
this matter. After the parties' requested extensions, a second hearing was held January 8, 
2002. At that hearing, Mr. Bradshaw was represented by J. Craig Cook and Scott Crook, 
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of the law firm of Nielsen & Senior, Wilkinson Water Company (Wilkinson Water or the 
Company) was represented by David Wright and William N White, of the law firm of 
White & Mabey, and the Division of Public Utilities (DPU) was represented by Kent 
Walgren, Assistant Attorney General 
At the January 8, 2002, heanng, the parties introduced evidence through 
the following witnesses Mr Bradshaw, William Birkes, a representative of the Utah 
Division of Dnnking Water, Department of Environmental Quality, Mike Babcock, a real 
estate developer, Barry Golding, an employee of the DPU, and Wayne Wilkinson, 
manager of Wilkinson Water. The evidence introduced at the January 8, 2002, heanng 
did not vary much from the evidence introduced at the pnor heanng held October 3, 
2000 Although the January 8, 2002, evidence replicates the pnor evidence, it does 
provide greater detail or depth on the circumstances facing Mr Bradshaw and Wilkinson 
Water It also highlights the ultimate underlying dispute between the parties and clanfies 
that the Commission's pnor order, although correct on the issue(s) that it addressed, did 
not resolve this dispute. The fundamental dispute between the parties concerns the just 
and reasonable terms, conditions and charges by which Wilkinson Water would serve m 
Mr Bradshaw's proposed real estate development, including customers who 
subsequently move into the development 
At the second evidentiary hearing, the parties presented evidence 
reflecting their respective views of how to calculate the demand for water utility services, 
from Wilkinson Water's existing customers and those that may locate in Mr Bradshaw's 
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proposed development, relative to Division of Drinking Water recommendations for 
water source (gallons per minute production capability) and water storage amounts. The 
parties have conflicting views on how to determine the irrigable area of lots of existing 
customers and possible future customers of the Company. This calculation has bearing on 
determining the gallons per minute that the Division of Drinking Water's 
recommendations suggest the Company's wells should be able to produce. Mr. 
Bradshaw's calculation results in a lower number, which on an average basis, appears to 
be within the Company's wells' current capacity. Wilkinson Water's calculation 
produces a higher number, which would appear to exceed the current capacity. 
Although the Commission believes that consideration of well production 
capacity has relevance in this matter, it does not believe that the absolute numbers 
resulting from the competing calculations should be directly applied in the fashion 
advocated by the parties. Whether the Company's wells appear to have production 
capacity that falls short of or exceeds the gallons per minute recommendations of the 
Division of Drinking Water, is not singularly dispositive of determining the terms and 
conditions by which Wilkinson Water would prepare to serve possible, future customers 
in Mr. Bradshaw's proposed development. As Mr. Birkes, a representative of the 
Division of Drinking Water, testified, the recommendations are just that, 
recommendations. A water company's actual well production capability may vary from 
the numerical value suggested in an application of the recommendations to the company 
and still be an approved system. Mr. Birkes' testimony established that a system's 
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evaluation is made on a number of factors. A company could have well capacity below or 
above the recommended gallons per minute and still receive either an approved or 
unapproved classification. Similar to the obligation our utility law imposes for "adequate 
service," see, U.C.A. § 54-3-1, the Division of Drinking Water's evaluation attempts to 
make a determination of the overall adequacy of a system's service. Absolute compliance 
with a water production recommendation is not necessary. 
Such evidence has less direct relationship in resolving the actual dispute 
between the parties. Were the dispute about Wilkinson Water's current adequacy of 
service to Mr. Bradshaw, as a water service consumer, or to other existing customers, we 
would place greater weight on such evidence. But the parties' dispute deals with who 
bears the costs, and the recovery of such costs, of preparing to meet anticipated, future 
water service demands of consumers who may move into Mr. Bradshaw's proposed 
development. As will be discussed below, the Commission believes this evidence has 
some relevance to our consideration, but not in a 'straight by the numbers' application 
presented by the parties. 
The parties' varying irrigable acreage assumptions and calculations also 
have an impact on comparing Wilkinson Water's water storage capacity to the level 
suggested by the Division of Drinking Water's recommendations. Again, Mr. Bradshaw's 
calculation results in a value below Wilkinson Water's current storage capacity; 
compared to the Company's calculation, which exceeds current capacity. In this instance, 
however, in addition to their opposing views of what constitutes the irrigable acreage, 
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Mr. Bradshaw also includes a smaller value (60,000 gallons as opposed to 120,000 
gallons) for storage levels for fire flow needs. Mr. Birkes' testimony established that the 
higher value is correct. When Mr. Bradshaw's calculation is corrected for this error, even 
his calculations show that the Company's existing storage capacity is less than that 
suggested by the recommendations. The testimony did establish that Wilkinson Water, in 
its usual operations, is using water storage capacity it does not own. Because the water 
storage capacity owned by the Wilkinson family is not physically segregated from the 
Company's storage capacity, the Company has routinely used the Wilkinson family's 
available capacity to meet the water service needs of the Company's customers. There 
was no evidence that the Company is paying the Wilkinson family any compensation for 
the Company's use of this additional storage capacity. As in well production capability, 
we believe information on water storage capacities is relevant, but not in as direct a 
fashion as advocated by the parties. 
Mr. Bradshaw reargues his contention that Wilkinson Water's Facility 
Extension Policy, included in its tariffs, has application in resolving the dispute. As we 
originally held, we disagree. As the Commission construes those provisions, they are not 
applicable to Mr. Bradshaw's situation. The Commission continues to construe the 
Facility Extension Policy as applicable to a customer or prospective customer who 
requires an extension of the Company's facilities in order to begin his own consumption 
of water services offered by the Company. As such, the tariffs overall provisions make 
sense, relative to a utility's cash flows and investments. The Company may be required to 
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extend its facilities, but the customer is required to bear the costs of extending 
distribution facilities and any necessary upgrades. Although the Facility Extension 
Policy's provisions state that the Company bears the costs of providing water storage and 
supply in this situalion, the Company also receives revenues from charging the customer 
the service connection charge set out in its tariff and receives ongoing monthly revenues 
from the customer's monthly fixed charge and water consumption charges included in the 
tariff. 
This is not Mr. Bradshaw's situation. Mr. Bradshaw would require 
Wilkinson Water to expand and upgrade facilities, not to meet Mr. Bradshaw's own 
water service consumption, but to be prepared to serve possible, future customers in his 
proposed development. But Mr. Bradshaw would make no additional contributions to the 
Company's costs beyond dedicating the distribution system which Mr. Bradshaw would 
ultimately install within the proposed development upon completion of the subdivison. 
The evidence introduced in this record shows that Mr. Bradshaw's efforts to actually 
develop the proposed subdivision have been intermittent. A number of years passed 
between the time Mr. Bradshaw first sought commitment from Wilkinson Water to 
provide water services to the proposed development and when he subsequently 
approached the Company for a written commitment from the Company. l 
1
 The written commitment is needed for Mr. Bradshaw to obtain preliminary approval for the proposed 
development from local government and zoning authorities 
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With Mr. Bradshaw's proposed multi-lot development, Wilkinson Water 
faces the prospect of incurring costs to be prepared to serve possible, future customers, in 
Mr. Bradshaw's multiple lot development. While the Company incurs such expansion 
costs in the near term, it would be left to the vagaries of the approval process for the 
subdivision, development of the real property, placement of the subdivision's 
infrastructure, individual lot marketing, sale, and development, and Mr. Bradshaw's 
diligence in performing these activities. Thereafter, the Company would have an 
opportunity to begin receiving revenues to help defray the costs incurred to be able to 
provide service to an ultimate customer who eventually receives water service in the 
proposed subdivision. While numerous utilities have tariff provisions that attempt to 
address the costs and risks, and allocation of the costs and risks, associated with a 
utility's for possible future service in a developer's proposed development, Wilkinson 
Water does not have such provisions in its tariff. It is precisely this lack of pre-existing 
tariff terms and conditions that precipitated the parties' dispute. The Commission's prior 
Order discusses relevant considerations the Commission has made in the past, when 
addressing the reasonableness of the terms and conditions a developer and utility2 face in 
this type of situation, but did not provide any resolution of the dispute in this particular 
case where Wilkinson Water has no applicable tariff provisions. In this regard, Wilkinson 
2
 The consideration is not limited to the impacts upon the developer and the utility. We must also consider 
the impact the terms and conditions may have on the existing and future customers of the utility. See, 
U.C.A.§54-3-1 Costs and risks not allocated to the developer or utility owners end up being shouldered by 
the utility's customers. 
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Water's existing water production and water storage capacities have some relevance. 
Where possible, future demand from individuals who may locate in Mr. Bradshaw's 
proposed subdivision make the Company's existing capacities appear to be inadequate, 
expansion may be reasonable. But the Company, and its existing customers, could be 
saddled with expanded plant, ready to provide service in Mr. Bradshaw's proposed 
development that may be slow to materialize, or never materialize, depending on Mr. 
Bradshaw's pace of activities and success. Mr. Bradshaw's request that the Company 
prepare to serve his multi-lot subdivision represents an increase of over ten percent in the 
Company's customer base and likely the same or greater increase in services demanded 
by this single project. The Commission believes that this scale is sufficiently significant 
for a small water utility and its existing customers to require the proposed subdivision's 
developer to participate in bearing the risks and costs of expanding a utility system to 
meet his project's needs. 
Having reviewed the January 4, 2000, Order on reconsideration, the 
Commission concludes that there is no need to alter the previous findings or discussion. 
The Commission recognizes, however, the need to address and provide guidance on the 
specific dispute between the parties, i.e., what constitutes just and reasonable terms and 
conditions by which Wilkinson Water would be prepared to provide future service to 
customers who may locate in Mr. Bradshaw's proposed subdivision, when the Company 
has no applicable tariff provisions. 
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The record does not develop a reason to depart from the Commission's 
past practice of placing the financial responsibility upon the real estate developer, with 
the concomitant developer opportunity to recover these costs in the sale of the developed 
property lots. In resolving this dispute, one must consider the direct costs of additional 
facilities and equipment and costs of their construction or installation; the costs incurred 
in the temporal disparities from the timing of preparation to provide utility service and 
the time transpiring in real estate development, from concept to actual customer 
occupancy on developed land; and the allocation of these costs and risks associated with 
their incurrence and recovery. As indicated in the prior Order, the Commission has 
concluded that it is just and reasonable to have the real estate developer shoulder the 
financial burden and risks associated with his own development. Otherwise, a small water 
utility's customers must be exposed to the detritus of the developer's possible failure or 
lack of profitable success. Nothing in the existing record supports a departure when 
dealing with Mr. Bradshaw's proposed development. 
This is not to say that the real estate developer must pay for any water 
plant facility conceived by the utility. The Commission places upon the developer the 
burden of his own development, but no more than what is reasonably attributable to 
providing service to his proposed development. The record developed in this case 
suggests that Wilkinson Water attempted to follow this approach in preparing to provide 
service to a real estate development undertaken by Mr. Babcock. Mr. Babcock was 
required to pay for the proportionate share of water plant that was installed in connection 
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with the Company's preparation to serve Mr. Babcock's proposed subdivision. The 
Commission concludes that it is reasonable to require Wilkinson Water and Mr. 
Bradshaw (and any other multi-lot real estate subdivision developer) to follow the same 
course, until Wilkinson Water has Commission approved tariff provisions which address 
this type of land development situation. 
Mr. Bradshaw will be required to pay for the proportionate share of water 
plant costs that are reasonably attributable to provide water service to his proposed 
subdivision. These costs include the physical water plant, which includes water source 
(new wells or upgrades for increased water production from existing wells), water storage 
tanks, water distribution facilities and equipment, and the costs incurred in planning for 
such plant and its construction and installation. We recognize that utility plant 
development is not necessarily sized, engineered or built to provide service solely to one 
development. Deployment of utility plant takes into consideration the current and future 
uses of existing customers, potential customers that might locate in the proposed 
subdivision and potential customers that may locate elsewhere in the utility's service 
territory. As long as the overall deployment of additional water plant is reasonable in 
relation to the Company's reasonable operations, Mr. Bradshaw should provide for the 
recovery of a proportionate amount of the costs. The proportion should be based upon the 
capability or capacity of the plant installed and the capability or capacity reasonably 
needed to provide service to Mr. Bradshaw's proposed development. Wilkinson Water 
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will bear the costs associated with water plant that is planned or put in place that exceeds 
the needs of Mr. Bradshaw's proposed development. 
The Commission hopes that the parties can reach agreement on what 
constitutes reasonable plant deployment, reasonable costs to deploy such plant and Mr. 
Bradshaw's reasonable proportion of such plant and costs. Because of the parties' past 
intractability in reaching a mutually acceptable resolution, that hope may prove futile. 
While it would be helpful to provide greater detail in this order, the record does not 
provide support for many detailed instructions. The parties begin with widely varying 
views on even the initial aspects of determining the water service demand for the 
proposed subdivision. From the record testimony, it appears reasonable to assume that the 
irrigable acreage of a lot is sixty to seventy percent of its total size. However, Mr. 
Bradshaw has significant control over the calculation of the irrigable acreage, based upon 
the restrictive covenants he may impose upon the lots he intends to develop. The record 
also reflects that calculations of water needs based upon Division of Drinking Water 
recommendations and assumed water consumption does not mirror actual use for 
individual consumers. Mr. Bradshaw's own prolific water consumption, as a current 
customer of Wilkinson Water, is notable in comparison to the consumption of other 
customers. 
Wilkinson Water complained that Mr. Bradshaw had not provided detailed 
engineering plans for the plant that is necessary to provide service to the proposed 
subdivision. It is not clear if these missing plans are for the distribution facilities (e.g., 
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pipes) to be located in the proposed subdivision, or if they are for other types of plant, 
located inside or outside of the subdivision, needed, in conjunction with existing 
Company plant, to be able to provide service to the proposed subdivision (e.g., storage 
tanks). In the first instance, it is reasonable to have Mr. Bradshaw provide plans for the 
distribution facilities to be placed in the proposed subdivision. If the later case, however, 
we would be surprised if Mr. Bradshaw has access to needed information on the location, 
design and capacity of the Company's existing plant, in order to prepare plans for the 
integration of existing and new plant that even he thought was reasonably needed to 
provide service to his proposed subdivision. The Commission believes it more likely that 
Wilkinson Water would study and prepare plans to integrate Mr. Bradshaw's proposed 
subdivision into the Company's water system. Wilkinson Water did introduce estimates 
of costs for plant that it could install, but did not present sufficient or credible evidence 
that the specified equipment and other items are reasonably necessary to prepare to 
provide service in Mr. Bradshaw's proposed subdivision and what Mr. Bradshaw's 
reasonable portion might be. 
Wherefore, based upon the record, our January 4, 2001, Order and the 
discussion herein, the Commission orders as follows: 
1. Should David Bradshaw desire to proceed with his proposed development 
and obtain Wilkinson Water Company's commitment to provide water 
utility service in the proposed subdivision, he shall be required to provide 
for a proportionate share of reasonable costs of reasonably necessary water 
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plant installed or required to provide utility service to the proposed 
subdivision. 
2. This order represents our final order on reconsideration. We recognize that 
the parties may have future disputes in implementing this order. We direct 
the Division of Public Utilities to act as a mediator to facilitate resolution 
of future disputes between the parties. 
3. To the extent that the parties are unable to reach mutually acceptable 
resolution of future issues, further proceedings may be conducted by the 
Commission. Parties will be required to submit an itemization of the 
aspects of an issue that continues to be disputed and pre-file evidence 
necessary to resolve the dispute. Scheduling of further proceedings will be 
set as needed. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 26th day of February, 2002. 
Sandy Mooy, 
Hearing Officer 
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Approved and Confirmed this 26th day of February, 2002, as the Report 
and Order of the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
^ MJ 
Stephe?rf\ KlecHanrrChairman ^ 
Constance B. White, Commissioner 
Richard M. Campbell, Commissioner 
Attest: 
Julie P. Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
Gr*:s::i 
I hereby certify that on day, Tuesday, February 26, 2002,1 served a true copy of 
the ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION hereto attached on the persons whose names are set 
forth below by mailing such copy on said date in a post office in Salt Lake City, Utah, properly 
enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage prepaid thereon, legibly addressed to the addresses 
shown: 
* See attached Mailing Lists and "E" Mailing Lists 
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Exhibit 3 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Complaint of 
DAVID L. BRADSHAW, 
Complainant 
vs. 
WILKINSON WATER COMPANY, 
Respondent 
DOCKET NO. 00-019-01 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Issued: January 4, 2001 
SYNOPSIS 
Complainant having failed to show any violation of Respondent's published tariffs or of the 
applicable statutes and Commission rules, we dismiss. 
Appearances: 
David L. Bradshaw 
William White 
By the Commission: 
In Propria Persona 
For WILKINSON WATER COMPANY 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Pursuant to notice duly served, the above-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing 
the third day of October, 2000, before A. Robert Thurman, Administrative Law Judge, at the 
Commission Offices, Heber Wells Building, Salt lake City, Utah. Evidence was offered and 
received, and the Administrative Law Judge, having been fully advised in the premises, now 
enters the following Report, containing proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the 
Order based thereon. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Complainant is a real estate developer wishing to market a subdivision located in the 
certificated area of Respondent, a certificated water corporation. Respondent is owned by 
the Wilkinson family, which also owns real estate in the area. The family has plans to 
develop its property, but nothing concrete or imminent. 
2. Respondent has indicated willingness to serve Complainant's subdivision, but only on 
condition that Complainant finance the costs of increased water source and storage 
capacity, which Respondent alleges is necessary to serve the project. 
3. Complainant contends that under Respondent's service extension tariff, he is not obliged 
to finance Respondent's infrastructure costs. 
4. At present, Respondent's system, according to Utah Division of Drinking Water (DDW) 
standards, is at or near capacity for both source and storage resources. In fact, as to 
storage, the company is in deficit, since part of the existing tank is owned by the 
Wilkinson family, which purchased an interest from the Respondent. The purchase was 
made at the urging of the Division of Public Utilities, Utah Department of Commerce 
(DPU) as a means of reducing rate base to the benefit of ratepayers. The purchase was 
made on the basis of an erroneous understanding of DDW requirements. The Wilkinson 
family has represented it is amenable to a resale of the storage capacity back to 
Respondent. 
5. For a previous subdivision in the area (Fox Hollow), the developer financed system 
improvements to the extent of approximately $100 per lot for enhanced source and $500 
per lot for increased storage - a total of approximately $100,000. Respondent estimates it 
would require a similar amount to upgrade the system to serve Complainant's 
subdivision. 
DOCKET NO. 00-019-01 
3 
6. Respondent is currently $130,000 in debt, mostly to the Wilkinson family, and has no 
borrowing capability from outside sources. 
7. Respondent has, on one occasion, extended service to a small (four or five lot) 
subdivision without requiring the developer to finance improvements to the system. 
However, apparently that project did not entail any system improvements by way of 
source or storage. 
DISCUSSION 
Complainant's claim to service without the necessity of financial participation in system 
improvements is based on Respondent's tariff PSC Utah No. 1, Sheet 8, which provides in 
paragraph 5 that "All costs for providing needed water supply and storage shall be paid by . . . 
.[Respondent]" 
However, the quoted paragraph must be read in conjunction with paragraph 1 which provides: 
An extension is any continuation of, or branch from, the nearest available existing 
line of the Company, including any increase in capacity of an existing line to the 
customer's requirement. (Emphasis added.) 
We believe the term "customer" in this context must mean a ratepayer of the utility, as 
opposed to a developer whose own customer will hook on to the system, but not the developer as 
such. Read together, then Paragraphs 1 and 5 obligate Respondent to extend service, with no 
charge for source or storage, to a party wishing to hook onto the system for the immediate 
delivery of water, not the developer of a speculative subdivision. 
A contrary construction would leave the utility at the mercy of a developer of a project of 
any size, with the concomitant potentiality of either bankrupting Respondent or imposing 
prohibitive rates on existing ratepayers to finance system improvements. This is clearly an 
unreasonable result. 
The Commission has a longstanding policy, extending back 20 years or more, of 
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requiring that real estate developers pay all costs of privately-owned water systems up front and 
recover their costs for such improvements in the price of lots. For rate making purposes, the costs 
of such improvements are allocated to a "Contribution in Aid of Construction" account which is 
not part of the Utility's rate base on which it is allowed to earn. 
In the vast majority of cases, the water system is owned by the developer which makes 
the implementation of the policy simple. The instant case presents a novel feature in that the 
developer is not the owner. However, in principle we see no reason why we should create an 
exception. The same hazards exist as to the interests of existing and future ratepayers as well as 
system integrity and viability. The developer has the same opportunity to set his lot prices so as 
to recover his costs. And the developer, if the project is viable at all, has better financing 
resources than the utility. In short, we do not believe existing ratepayers should be made 
unwilling participants in Complainant's speculation.1 
We believe it is in the public interest that Complainant defray the costs of system 
improvements necessary to procure the necessary governmental approvals for, and service to, his 
project. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Commission has party and subject-matter jurisdiction. Complainant has failed to 
prove violations of Respondents tariffs, or of Commission rules, or other applicable law. 
Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
• the complaint of DAVID L. BRADSHAW against WILKINSON WATER 
COMPANY, be, and the same hereby is, dismissed. 
:Nor do we have jurisdiction to require the owners to increase their investment in the utility. 
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• If DAVID L. BRADSHAW wishes to proceed further, DAVID L. BRADSHAW 
may file a written petition for review within 20 days of the date of this Order. 
Failure so to do will forfeit the right to appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 4th day of January, 2001. 
y l^(^J^,y/Xa-y^^L. 
A. Robert Thurman 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and Confirmed this 4th day of January, 2001, as the Report and Order of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah. 
StephenT. Mecnam, Chairman 
Constance B. White, Commissioner 
\J\Jl-^ 






I hereby certify that on Thursday, January 4, 2001,1 served a true copy of the hereto 
attached REPORT AND ORDER on the persons whose names are set forth below by mailing 
such copy of said date in a post office in Salt Lake City, Utah, properly enclosed in a sealed 
envelope with postage prepaid thereon, legibly addressed to the addresses shown 
*See attached mailing Lists and "E" Mailing lists 
Knstina Anderson 
Exhibit 4 
J. Craig Smith (4143) 
D. Scott Crook (7495) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Submitted July 20. 2001 
Attorneys for Petitioner David L. Bradshaw 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In the matter of the Complaint of DAVID L. : DOCKET NO. 00-019-01 
BRADSHAW. * : 
Complainant. ISSUES AND FACT LIST FOR 
REHEARING 
vs. : 
WILKINSON WATER COMPANY. : 
Respondent. : 
Pursuant to the Commission's Scheduling Notice dated June 6, 2001. Petitioner. Da\id L. 
Bradshaw. by and through his undersigned counsel, and Respondent. Wilkinson Water Company. 
by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby submit the following Issues and Fact List for 
Rehearing: 
STIPULATED FACTS 
Petitioner and Respondent hereby stipulate to the following facts: 
1. Petitioner. David L. Bradshaw. is a real estate developer u ho owns real property in 
Morgan County. Utah (the "Subject Property") within the certificated area of Wilkinson Water 
i :04-l QR03-1 UiH 
Company for which he has been granted both Concept and Preliminary appro\al by the Morgan 
County Planning Commission for a 21-lot residential subdnision called the Cottonwood Creek 
Subdnision 
2 Respondent. Wilkinson Water Company, is a certificated w ater utility subject to 
Commission jurisdiction which pro\ides culinary water to se\eral residents and businesses in 
Morgan County, Utah 
3 Petitioner and Respondent ha\ e been engaged in ongoing discussions and 
negotiations to reach an agreement regarding the just and reasonable charge to connect the 
Subject Property to the culinary water utility of Respondent 
4 Petitioner is w aiting for an updated '"Will Serve" letter from the Respondent in 
order to recene Final Approval from the Morgan County Planning Commission for the 
Cottonwood Creek Subdnision 
5. The Utah Administrative Code R309-203. Table 203-1 titled "Source Demand for 
Community Water Systems (Indoor Use)." pio\ides that peak day demand for residential 
connections is 800 gpd or 56 gpm per lot Accordingly, the amount of source capacity for 
indoor use for Petitioner's subdn lsion is 11 76 gpm ( 56 gpm x 21 lots). 
6. The Utah Administrative Code, R309-207(b), titled "Estimated Outdoor Use." 
pro\ ides the appropriate calculation necessary for outdoor water use for residential oropeny The 
section proudes that to detemine irrigable acreage, start with "gross acreage, then subtract out 
any area of roadway, driveway, sidewalk or patio pavements along with housing foundation 
footprints that can be reasonably expected for lots within a new subdnision " 
120-ri BR034I 001 -
7. The Utah Administrative Code. Table 203-4 requnes J-00 gallons storage for indoor 
use for each lot. Hence. Petitioner's proposed de\ elopment \\ ould require a storage capacity of 
S.400 gallons for indoor use (21 lots x 400 gallons) 
8. Utah Admin Code R309-203(S)(2)(c) requires 1,873 gallons per irrigable acre of 
storage capacity. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
Petitioner and Respondent state that the following facts are disputed and must be 
resolved: 
1. The amount of infrastructure cost \\ ithin the subdn lsion that Da\ id L Bradshaw 
will be required to pay to connect residences to the existing water s\ stem. 
2. The total amount of source capacity that Wilkinson Water Company has. 
3. The total amount of storage capacin that the Wilkinson Water Company has. 
4 What the a\erage lmgable acreage of each .46 acre lot in the Petitioner's proposed 
subdn ision is. 
5 The amount of residential connections that Wilkinson Water Company current!} 
has and the number of committed connections. 
ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED 
Petitioner and Respondent agree that the following issues are the issues to be resolved: 
1. Whether Wilkinson Water Company's tariff prohibits Wilkinson Water Company 
from requiring Mr Bradshaw to pay for improvements other than extensions to his property? 
2. What the reasonable and just charge for connecting to the utility is? 
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DISPUTED ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED 
Petitioner and Respondent state that there is a dispute as to whether the following issue 
has been raised and whether it should be resolved: 
1. Whether Wilkinson Water Company's demand that Mr. Bradshaw pay-
infrastructure costs in excess of those necessarv to serve his subdivision violates Utah law'? 
DATED this f T d a v o N - L t y . 2001. 
/ /) 
DATED this Arsdav of ~;,.,;, . 2001. 
r \/-^k M , -J, Craig Smith 
D'. Scott Crook 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner David L. Bradshaw 
William N. White 
WHITE & MABEY 
Attorneys for Wilkinson Water Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2^ day of •J;v^^\/- . 2001. a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing STIPULATED FACTS was mailed via first class United States mail, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
William N. White. Esq. 
WHITE & MABEY 
265 East 100 South. Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Kent L. Walgren. Esq. 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South. Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Division of Public Utilities 
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